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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\VHIT~IORE

OXYGEN COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

7154

Defendarnt.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE TAX COMMISSION IN
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANTING OF A
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff herein filed a petition for rehearing in the
above 'entitled case and based its petition upon the following grounds :
I

The court, having reached the conclusion that "for
tax purposes the sale of the cylinders was consummated
in Indiana,'' erred in holding that the sale was not subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
ject to the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 as the
same was in effect in the year 1941.
II

By the inclusion of supplemental comments, counsel
for plaintiff infers that the court erred in holding that
Tax Commission Form TC 71, as filed by the Tax Commission by taxpayers, did not constitute a us·e tax return.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The court, having reached the conclusion that "for tax
purposes the sale of the cylinders was consummated in
Indiana," ·erred in holding that the sale was not subject
to the Indiana Gross Income Thx Act of 1933 as the same
was in ,effect in the year 1941.
Plaintiff's argument that the court erred in holding
that the sale herein involved was not subject to the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, is apparently
based upon plaintiff's supposition that the writer's citation of the case of" J. D. A~ams Manufactr~Mrimg Oompa;n;y
v. Sto·rern (1938), 304 U.S. 307, 82 L. ed. 1365, was loosely
cited and that the original presentation of the problem
by counsel for the Tax Commission was not adequate.
With such contention we most heartily disagree. It is
the position of defendant that the J. D. Adams case is
controlling in this matter and that the argument presented by counsel for rehearing is entirely without merit,
and, further, that the authorities cited are just plainly
not in point.
The plaintiff makes the assertion that the Indiana
Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 was amended ''to meet
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
the Adams case." (Plaintiff's Brief, page 5.) Plaintiff
does not explain how this an1endment was made or what
such amendment is and we are unable to determine just
which portion of the Indiana Act that counsel feels was
amended to meet this case.
Subsection (a) of 6-±-2606, Gross Income Tax Act of
1933, (Burns, Indiana Statute Annotated, 1933, 1943
replacement) which excepts interstate commerce as
originally passed by the Indiana Legislature, reads as
follows:
''There shall be excepted from the gross income taxable under this act:
'' (a) So much of such gross income as is
derived from business conducted in commerce between this state and other states of the United
States, or between this state and :foreign countries, to the extent to which the State of Indiana
is prohibited from taxing under the Oonstitution
of the United States of America." Laws of the
St,ate of Indiarna, 1933, 78th Sessvon, page 392.
This section was amended in 1937 (approved March
9, 1937) to read as follows:
''That section 6 of the first above entitled act
be amended to read as follows : Sec. 6. There shall
be excepted from the gross income taxable under
this act:
'' (a) So much of such gross income as is
derived from business conducted in commerce between this state and other states of the United
States, or between this state and foreign countries, but only to the extent to which the State
of Indiana is prohibited from taxing such gross
income by the Constitution of the United States
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of America. * * *" Laws 10/ India.t11ta, 1937 80th
page 61~.
The sub-section, as so amended, has remained in
·effect since March 8, 1937 to the present date. It will be
noted that the only changes made by the 1937 amendment
is to insert the words "but only" preceding the words
"to the extent", and "such gross income" following the
words "prohibited from taxing" in subsection (a) of
section 6.
The Adams case was decided by the Supreme Court
of Indiana, April 30,1937, some 61 days after the Act was
amended. In Storen v. J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company (1937), 212 Ind. 343, 7 N.E. 2d 941, the Supreme
Court of Indiana sustained the constitutionality of the
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933. The case was
then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
and was subsequently decided on the 18th day of May,
1938.
Sess~on,

Section 1, of the Indiana Gross Income 'Tax Act of
1933, as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the J. D. Adams case, "declares that the phrase
'gross income' as used in the act, means, inter alia, gross
receipts derived from the trades, businesses, or commerce, and receipts from investment of capital, including interest.'' Section I, as it defines ''gross income,''
was amended in 1937, which entirely reworded the section. However, since no material change was made after
1937, it may be concluded that no amendment was made
to section I, as it defines ''gross income,'' by reason of the
J.D. Adams Company case. The only other section of the
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Indiana Gross Incmue Tax Act of 1933, which was considered by the Suprerne Court of the United State~, was
section II, which, as pointed out by such court, ''imposes
a tax ascertained by the application of specified rates
to the gross income of every resident of the state and the
gross income of every non-resident derived from sources
within the state." The same argument applies with regard to section II; that is, no amendment was made
except in 1937 which could not have been influenced by
the J.D. Adams case.
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is the opinion
of the writer that no amendment was made to the Indiana
Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 because of the J. D. Adams
Company case. As we view it, the Adams case merely
placed an interpretation upon the foregoing S'ections
which precludes the State of Indiana from including the
receipts from interstate sales in the measure of the tax.
The amendment made to chapter 2601 in 1941, referred
to by plaintiff in his brief on page 5, would have no
affect upon the decision in this case even if it be viewed
as having some material change in the definition of
"gross income" for the reason that chapter 140, Laws
of Indiana, 1941, page 418, which amended section 1, did
not take effect until the 1st day of January, 1942, which
was after the contract was accepted by the Whitmore
Oxygen Company. The contract being accepted April18,
1941.

As indicated by this court, the Adams case holds
with regard to the case at Bar, that a state may not tax
receipts from interstate sales for the reason that interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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state commerce would be subjected to the risk of a double
tax burden. Defendant ·elects to stand and rely on the
J.D. Adams Manufacturing Company case as originally
argued.
Now, curiously enough, the plaintiff cites as authority for the proposition that the sale was subject to the
Indiana tax, the case of the Department of Treasury of
Indiana, et ·al, v. International Harvester Company
(1943), 221 Indiana 416, 47 N.E. 2d 150. Although this
case was decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the
year 1943, the case arose by reason of the fact that appellees sued to recover gross income taxes paid to the
State of Indiana during the years 1935 and 1936 and thus
of necessity the case was decided under the identical law
as existed when the J.D. Adams case arose.
The Supreme Court of the United States in deciding
the International Harvester Company case cited the J.
D. Adams case and said:
''In that case an Indiana corporation which
manufactured products and maintained its home
office, principal place of business and factory in
Indiana sold those products to customers in other
states and foreign countries upon orders taken
subject to approval at the home office. It was
held that the commerce clause ('Art. I, sec. 8 of
the Constitution) was a barrier to the imposition
of the tax on the gross receipts from such sales.
But as we held in the Wood Pr·eserving Corporation case, neither the commerce clause nor the
14th amendment prevent the imposition of tax
from receipts from an imJtlrast1ate transaction even
though the total activities from which the local
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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transaction derives may have incidental interstate attributes.'' Internatiiowal H~ar'vesitler Oompany r. Department 0f Treasury of India,wa
(1943), 322 U.S. 340, 88 L. Ed. 1313. (Italics supplied)
1

Plaintiff has apparently set forth ''Class D '' sales
as being the type of transaction which most nearly
parallels the \Yhitmore Oxygen-Linde Air Products
transaction herein involved. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the International Harvester Company
case in considering Olass D sales said:
''The Class D sales are sales by an Indiana
seller of Indiana goods to an out of state buyer
who comes to Indiana, takes delivery there and
transports the goods to another state. The Wood
Preserving Corporation case indicates that it is
immaterial to the present issue that the goods are
to be transported out of Indiana immediately on
delivery. ~foreover, both the agreement to sell and
the delivery took place in Indiana. Thos,e events
would be adequate to sustain a sales tax by Indiana." (Italics supplied.)
The Wood Preserving Corporation case referr,ed
to above by the Supreme Court was a cas-e in which
the respondent, Wood Preserving Corporation, enter,ed
into certain contracts with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to sell railroad ties. The ties were purchased by the respondent from local companies in the
state of Indiana and the Indiana vendors delivered the
ties at loading points on the railroad in Indiana. An inspector for the railroad and an agent of the respondent
accepted the ties and supervised the loading. Inspection
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and loading were simultaneous. The Supreme Court in
speaking of this liability said: ''The transactions were
none the 'less intrastate activities because the ties thus
sold and delivered were forthwith loaded on the railroad
cars to go to Ohio for treatment." Department of Ttreasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62, 85 L. ed.
1188.
We submit that the type of transaction involved in
the International Harvester Company case and the Wood
Preserving Corporation case in no way parallels the
transaction herein involved. In those cases the purchaser
of the goods went· to the State of Indiana and himself
took physical possession or delivery of the goods within
that state, and thereafter transported such goods outside
of the state on his own account.
We believe that the distinction is clear and that the
principle of law which may be deduced from the J. D.
Adams case and the International Harvester Company
case is, ·that wher;e a tnansact~on is oompleted withim t:he
borders of the state and nothing furthBr ·remains to be
·done such .as, sh~pment ~out of the sbate:, that. such state
may constitutiowally impose .a gnoss ·receipts t'ax o·r
similar tax upon such transaction. However, where the
trans·act~on is s'o inse,pla.rably oonnecfAed with interst•ate
commerce by the terms of the contract, that the goods
must be shipped out ·Of the state before s~aid t,ramsaction
is oompleted, then ,no tax may constitvutiowally be ~.m
poSIBd.
In the case at Bar, we have a situation wherein
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the vendor, Linde Air Products Company, agreed to sell
the cylinders to the Whitmore Oxygen Company f.o.b.
Speedway, Indiana. Deliv,ery of said cylinders was made
to a common carrier, and thus we take the view that
while the sa.J.e was consummated in Indiana, that something more was contemplated by the terms of the contract than was contemplated in ·the situation as outlined
by Class D sales in the International Harvester Company
case. In that case the buyer went to the state of Indiana
and personally took delivery and then later himself ·transported the goods to another state.
We submit, therefore, that this court was corr•ect in
holding that "The sale is, then, one which the Supreme
Court has said may not be taxed by the state of Indiana,
under the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933. ''
Point II
By the inclu.sion of supplemental comments, counsel
for plaintiff infers that the court •erred in holding that Tax
Commission Form TC 71, as filed with the Tax Commission
by taxpayers, did not constitute a use tax return.

In plaintiff's supplemental comments, the contention is again set forth that the filing of Form 'TC 71,
entitled "Sales and Use Tax Return", consisting of
two parts in which entries relating to sales tax have
been made in the sales tax portion of the form, but in
which ,entries have not been made in the use tax portion
of the form, constitutes a use tax return for the purpose
of starting the period of the statute of limitations for
collecting a use tax deficiency determination.
It is submitted that this contention has been argued
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and decided, and the supplemental comments made by
the plaintiff are merely an attempt on the part of plaintiff to have the court adopt his origina:l theory that the
filing of TC 71, with the use tax portion blank, starts
the period of the statute of limita;tions.
We believe the fact that the question involved is one
of first impression nationally and that several members
of the Bar of sister states are concerned with the ruling
of this court is of no importance and certainly not sufficient reason to grant a rehearing. It is fundamental in
this jurisdiction that, ''New points first brought to the
Supreme Court's attention on application for rehearing,
though they were just as available on original hearing,
cannot be considered.'' Dahlquist v. Dmuuer & Rio Grarnd
Railway, 52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833; Swans:orn v. rSims,
51 Utah 485,170 Pac. 774.
We take the view that the argument of plaintiff set
forth in the supplemental comments, while, as we view it
are without merit, are also improperly presented inasmuch as such argument was just as available on the
original hearing. Shou1d the court feel that the argument as presented with regard to the filing of Form
TC 71 should be considered, we would like to point out
that such argument is faulty inasmuch as Regulation No.
12, cited by plaintiff, which requires that a return must
be made even though no tax is due, applies only to the
sales tax.
Sa:les tax regulation No. 12~ quoted by plaintiff, has
a heading which appears as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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12-Filing of Returns.
(Applies to sales tax only.)

The portion of this regulation italicized by plaintiff in
his brief on page 9, which reads as follows : ''The 11eturn
mu.st be made ene-n though no tax lis due," refers only
to sales tax liability imposed under the Sales Tax A~t.
No such requirement is impos~ed upon taxpayers whose
sole liability is that of a consmner or user for use tax:
liability. Such a person shall make the return on Form
TC 326 '' Consmner Use Tax Return.''
Inasmuch as the case at Bar involves a use tax deficiency and not a sales tax deficiency, plaintiff's conclusion that the Tax Commission would require a taxpayer who had no use tax liability "to file a sales and
use tax form 71, regardless of whether therie is amy tag;
due ~or not," is, we believe, totally without merit.
It is the law in this jurisdiction that no hearing wil~
be granted "unless the court has minconstrued or overlooked some material fact or facts, or has overlooked
some statute or decision which may affect the result, or
has based the decision on some wrong principle of law
or has either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result." Oummings v. Nielson,
42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619.
It is submitted that no material fact is presented in
plaintiff's argument, nor is any fact presented which
could not have been presented in the original argument.
There is no indication that the court has misconstrued or
overlooked anything that would materially affect this
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case and no rehearing should be granted where nothing
new or important is offered for consideration. Duchenearu v. Hou.se, 4 Utah 483, 11 Pac. 618; Jones v.
H-ouse, 4 Utah 484, 11 Pac. 619. Plaintiff's only reason
for a rehearing which might be considered by the court is
his assertion that the J. D. Adams case is not in point.
Such, we submit, is not the case and as heretofore stated,
defendant relies upon the rule announced in the Adams
case.
CONCLUSIDN

In conclusion we submit that the plaintiff has not
presented sufficient reason for granting a rehearing.
Plaintiff indicates that the court has based its decision
on a wrong principle of law as to the taxability of sa'les
made by an Indiana vendor to customers in other states.
However, we submit that this court did not base its decision on a wrong principle of law but reaffirmed and
set forth a proper interpretation of the law with regard
to interstate sales.
In the case of Brown 1J. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, and
In Re McKnight, 4 Utah 237, this court recognized the
doctrine that "to justify a rehearing a strong case must
be made. The Supreme Court must be convinced either
that it failed to ·consider some material point in the case;
that it erred in its conclusion or that some matter has
been discovered which was unknown at the time of the
original hearing.''
This court in its well reasoned opinion has thoroughly examined the issues in this case and the plaintiff has
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not made out a case or presented sufficient reason for
this court to grant a rehearing.
THEREFORE, it is requested that a rehearing be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
G. HAL TAYLOR,
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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